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Abstract
This article investigates the media context of Myanmar’s recent political reforms and transition of power. Drawing on in-
terviews with 57 Yangon-based media professionals, the article analyzes the media’s role as both an agent and subject of
political change as Myanmar prepared for parliamentary elections in November 2015. It asks to what extent changes in
the Myanmar media system adhere to existing theories of the media’s role in the democratization process. Specifically,
the article analyzes the features and functions of Myanmar’s media during the country’s liberalization from 2010 to 2015.
The article concludes by assessing what Myanmar’s experience adds to our theoretical understanding of the media’s trans-
formation during liberalization.
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1. Introduction
2016 was a monumental year in Myanmar. Parliamen-
tary elections in November 2015 delivered a landslide
victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democ-
racy (NLD). In March 2016, the NLD’s Htin Kyaw became
Myanmar’s first civilian president since the military coup
in 1962, a role denied to Aung San Suu Kyi by the junta-
drafted constitution because she married a foreigner.
The NLD’s 2015 election victory is the culmination of a
five-year reform process. In March 2011, Myanmar’s rul-
ing junta handed power to a new nominally civilian gov-
ernment, led by former general President Thein Sein. The
new president initiated a series of reforms leading to a
substantial opening of the former pariah state (Hlaing,
2012). Most dramatically, these reforms include allow-
ing Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to contest parliamen-
tary by-elections in April 2012, following her release from
house arrest in November 2010. Reforms also included
releasing hundreds of political prisoners, reaching pre-
liminary peace agreements with the majority of armed
ethnic groups and gradually reducing restrictions on me-
dia freedom. In August 2012, Thein Sein’s government
abolished the Ministry of Information’s pre-publication
censorship regime (Harris, 2013). Previously off-limits
topics such as rampant corruption, inequality, ethnic con-
flicts, and government land-grabs began to feature fre-
quently on the front pages.
Myanmar’s media have been center stage in the
country’s transition process, both as a subject and agent
of change. Media and politics influence each other. This
article investigates the media’s role in Myanmar’s de-
mocratization during the five-year liberalization process
preceding parliamentary elections in November 2015.
Myanmar was selected as an illustrative case against
which to compare existing theories of the media’s func-
tions and features during liberalization for the purpose
of both testing and refining these theories.
To develop a more nuanced understanding of the
conditions and consequences of the Myanmar media’s
involvement in the democratization process, the article
draws a distinction between structure and agency. The
structural dimensions refer to the economic, technolog-
ical and political context in which the media operate.
Agency denotes the editorial aspects of the media. Jour-
nalists play an active role in constructing social reality,
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by setting the agenda for public discourse and by fram-
ing narratives that give meaning to political events. The
interplay between structure and agency creates the op-
portunities and constraints that shape both the media’s
influence on democratic change and the impact of polit-
ical change on the media.
2. The Media and Democratization
Before analyzing themedia as a factor in political change,
it is first necessary to define democratization. At its most
simple, democratization is a journey between two ideal
points on the political spectrum: closed autocracy at one
end and open democracy at the other. In reality, no
regime conforms to an ideal type (Dahl, 1998). Autoc-
racy and democracy are both contested concepts that de-
scribe a range of real-world regimes. Likewise, there are
many paths between these two points. Scholars of de-
mocratization have tried to identify the regular stepping-
stones thatmark this journey. A developmental theory of
democratization assumes linear progress along sequen-
tial steps. The most widely used schema distinguishes
between three main stages of democratization: liberal-
ization of the autocratic regime; transition to democratic
rule; and the consolidation of the new democratic order
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). The process of regime
change, however, is not always linear. Timing and se-
quencing vary between cases. In some states, different
stages can occur simultaneously. Some states may skip
one stage altogether. Others go back as well as forward
along the path to democracy. Myanmar’s democratiza-
tion has been far from straightforward. In November
2014, Aung San Suu Kyi declared that the international
community had been too optimistic about the results of
liberalization begun in 2010 (Tha, 2014). Media freedom
and human rights groups concurred, arguing that 2014
witnessed significant backsliding (Committee to Protect
Journalists, 2014b; Human Rights Watch, 2015). Thomas
Carothers argues that many states get stuck at the transi-
tion stage and never arrive at consolidated democracy
(2002). To account for the range of routes, Schneider
and Schmitter (2004) refer to liberalization, transition
and consolidation as ‘components’ rather than phases
of democratization.
The distinction between the three components of de-
mocratization is a useful conceptual tool for media schol-
ars. As Katrin Voltmer theorizes that, depending on the
particular component of the democratization process—
liberalization, transition or consolidation—the media af-
fect the course of events in different ways (2013, p. 72).
At the same time, changes in political circumstances al-
ter the constraints and opportunities for journalists and
othermedia professionals. This article looks at theMyan-
mar’smedia as the country liberalized between 2010 and
2015. During liberalization, authoritarian leaders loosen
their grip on society, allowing citizens more personal,
professional and political freedom. Relaxing media cen-
sorship is an important part of this process. Liberalization
is often a strategic response by the ruling elite to main-
tain their power in reaction to mounting domestic and
external pressure for political change. Domestically, the
impetus for liberalization can be top–down or bottom–
up. In Myanmar’s case, a combination of poor develop-
ment prospects, unrest among large sections of the pop-
ulation, an effective opposition movement, and West-
ern sanctions that deepened economic dependence on
China, convinced the ruling regime to initiate a largely
top–down liberalization process as ameans to retain con-
trol over the direction of political change.
3. Approach and Methods
Voltmer theorizes that the functions performed by the
media in liberalizing autocracies vary depending on the
impetus for liberalization (2013, p. 79). Based on her
comparative research, she distinguishes between three
models of liberalization based on the direction and ori-
gins of political change: bottom–up; top–down; and ex-
ternal influences. In reality these three processes are of-
ten interdependent. And as Voltmer points out, external
influences are unlikely to trigger liberalization indepen-
dently of the preferences of domestic actors.
Voltmer’swork offers a rare attempt to conceptualize
a general theory of the media’s role in the liberalization
process. Her theories are the starting point for my analy-
sis. I assess towhat extent theMyanmarmedia exhibited
the features and function associatedwith her three inter-
dependent models during the country’s liberalization by
answering the following research question:
Towhat extent do Voltmer’s theories of the role of the
media in political liberalization explain the liberaliza-
tion of Myanmar’s media?
To further structure my analysis of the Myanmar me-
dia as a subject and agent of political change, I draw
on Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) four dimension compar-
ative framework of media systems. First, journalistic pro-
fessionalism denotes the norms that constitute the me-
dia’s professional identity and that inform the standards
of news reporting. Second, political parallelism describes
the ties that the media develop with political interest
groups within society. Third, the media are strongly influ-
enced by the state, a relationship that involves elements
of both dependency and enmity. Finally, the media are
embedded within economicmarkets. In borrowing from
Hallin and Mancini I hope to enhance the relevance of
my study to comparativists working to refine typologies
of media systems, as well as to add to the scholarly de-
bate on the role of themedia in democratization.My the-
oretical approach is set out in Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, Voltmer’s three liberalization mod-
els are divided into four dimensions based on Hallin and
Mancini’s media systems framework. Although my anal-
ysis of the Myanmar media is divided into four distinct
dimensions, this does not imply that transformations
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Table 1. Features and functions of the media system during liberalization. Source: Voltmer (2013, pp. 79–92); Hallin and
Mancini (2004).
Bottom–up Liberalization Top–down Liberalization Externally-Influenced Liberalization
Ag
en
cy
Pr
of
es
sio
na
lis
m
Partisanship prioritized over
objective and accurate
reporting
Content of oppositional media
produced by activists rather
than journalists
Ritualized rhetoric of the state
media replaced by more
accessible language
Journalists serve the political
and economic interests of
financial backers rather than
the public interest
Prioritizing of information
delegitimizing the regime and
rallying popular resistance
Outsiders often misjudge the
domestic reception and
interpretation of information they
provide
St
ru
ct
ur
e
Pa
ra
lle
lis
m
Close relationship between
journalists and the opposition
Media a tool to build alliances
across diverse opposition
groups divided by race and
class
Journalists alignment with one
of rival factions within the
regime (hard liners or soft
liners)
Liberalization deepens divisions
within ruling regime between
hard and soft liners
Domestically available exiled and
foreign media sustain opposition
resolve by providing a sense of
solidarity
Copying and distributing
transborder media to those who
cannot receive it directly expands
opposition network
St
at
e
State suppression and
surveillance of independent
media
State grants new freedoms, but
for their own political purpose,
not as constitutional rights
State determines scope of
political debate—some topics
remain taboo despite relaxing
censorship
State jams international
broadcasts and imposes stiff
penalties for those consuming and
distributing forbidden media
Limited access for foreign
journalists
M
ar
ke
ts
Pro-democracy opposition
have their own media
(including dissident and
underground media) that
challenge state media
narratives
State-controlled media persists,
despite marketization
delivering some pluralism
Independent media largely
dependent on intra-regime
factions for economic survival
Opposition (including media)
funded by foreign donors and
political exiles
Foreign media available in the
domestic market
within each arena are discreet. Rather, developments
within each dimension of the media system, as well as
cross the three models of liberalization are considered
interdependent.
To reveal the changes that took place in Myanmar’s
media system during the country’s liberalization period,
my research drawon face-to-face interviewswith 57 jour-
nalists, editors,media owners and trainersworking in the
Myanmar-basedmedia.Mymethods are therefore exclu-
sively qualitative. Interviewees’ affiliations are detailed
in Table 2.
Interviews conducted by the author took place pri-
marily during twoperiods of fieldwork in December 2013
and December 2014. Follow-up interviews were con-
ducted electronically between September and Decem-
ber 2015. Naturally, a potential problem with interview
data is deliberate distortion. Given the volatility of the
political situation in Myanmar, it may be professionally
or legally helpful to censor one’s views, or to hide knowl-
edge of any wrongdoing. To mitigate this problem, inter-
viewees were offered anonymity. Furthermore, multiple
sources from different organizations were interviewed,
and in several cases re-interviewed, to alleviate the ef-
fects of embellishment or misinformation. Where appro-
priate, I draw attention to conflicting accounts and opin-
ions in my discussion below. Basing my analysis of Myan-
mar’s media liberalization on the views of journalists
working inside system, however, is a potential weakness
of my study, as it is not always possible to adequately
evaluate and corroborate their testimonies.
Interviewees were initially selected from among my
personal contacts in the Yangon-based media. Intervie-
wees then introduced me to their colleagues and as-
sociates, leading to a snowballing method of selection.
Some interviewees proved particularly knowledgeable
and were re-interviewed. My personal contacts in Myan-
mar work in the print media. The majority of their as-
sociates are also print journalists. This led to over rep-
resentation of print journalists relative to professionals
from other media sectors among my interviewees. Ar-
guably, the print media is the most relevant sector to an-
alyze when investigating the impact of liberalization on
the Myanmar media. At the time of writing, the Myan-
mar government retains almost exclusive control over
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Table 2. Interviewees affiliation (no. interviewees).
NGO (12) Print (30) Broadcast (6) Professional Body (5) Online* (1) International (3)
Tagaung Institute 11 Media (3) DVB (3) Pen International Kamayut Radio Free Asia
Media
BBC Media Mizzima (3) Skynet Interim Press New York Times
Action (3) Council (3)
Internews 7 Day News (3) Mandalay FM Myanmar Journalist Agence France-
Network Presse
Open Society Institute Street View Journal MRTV
Burma News Myanmar Freedom
International (3) Daily (2)
Karen Information The Chronicle (2)
Centre
Pandita Institute (2) Pae Tin Thran
Yanant Thit
Women Can Do It
Myanmar Times (2)
The Voice (3)
Arakan Journal
Yangon Times
The People’s Age
Irrawaddy (2)
Chin World News
Human Rights &
Democracy Journal
Notes: Total 57 interviewees, 17 women and 40 men. * Many print and TV media also have associated websites. Here online is used for
media outlets available only on the web.
the broadcast media. Journalists at state broadcasters
were reluctant to be interviewed, fearing negative con-
sequences at the hands of their employers (only one
journalist from state-owned MRTV agreed to an inter-
view). Three journalists/editors at private satellite broad-
caster DVB, currently the only Myanmar television chan-
nel not directly or indirectly owned by the state, were in-
terviewed. The most popular online news sites in Myan-
mar are those run by themajor newspapers (for example,
Eleven Media and 7 Day News). Their online content is
very similar to what appears in print and is written by the
same journalists. Interviews with print journalists, there-
fore included questions about their publication’s associ-
ated website. The sharing of news articles on social me-
dia was also discussed with all interviewees.
Interviewees were asked open-ended questions, for
example:
• How has the end of official censorship influenced
your work?
• Can you describe your experience of reporting on
the NLD?
• How would you characterize media reporting on
inter-ethnic tensions?
Care was taken to avoid phrasing questions in a manner
that might elicit specific kinds of responses. Although the
same general questions were asked to each interviewee,
interviews did not follow a set script. Rather, interviewees
were encouraged to elaborate and refine their answers
with spontaneous follow up questions. Most interviews
were approximately one hour to 90 minutes in length.
Following Hallin and Mancini, my discussion below
is divided into four sections. In the first section, I begin
by analyzing journalists’ professionalism—defined as the
media’s professional norms and practices (Benson, 2004;
Klinenberg, 2002). Section two examines political paral-
lelism. The third section analyses the role of the state
in shaping the functioning of the media system. The fi-
nal section investigates the influence of economic fac-
tors shaping the mediamarket. I conclude by comparing
the changing characteristics of the Myanmar media dur-
ing liberalization to the theoretic expectations outlined
in Table 1.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Professionalism
As outlined in Table 1, Voltmer’s theories identify factors
closely related to political parallelism as the main obsta-
cles impeding journalistic professionalism during liberal-
ization. Journalists eschew their neutral watchdog role to
become opposition activists (bottom–up liberalization)
or guard dogs protecting the interests of their economic
and political paymasters (top–down liberalization). The
media in exile that are a feature of externally-influenced
liberalization are also far from neutral, framing their re-
ports to undermine support for the existing regime. Un-
doubtedly, reporting in the Myanmar media was highly
politicized during the country’s liberalization. Issues re-
lating to political bias, however, are discussed in the next
section on political parallelism.
Interviews for this study reveal that poor education,
the influence of social media and ethnic tensions, as well
as political factors undermine the application of interna-
tionally recognized professional standards in the Myan-
mar media. Journalists in liberalizing states often poorly
understand the norms expected of their profession in a
democracy, as for decades state censors externally im-
posed standards on the media. In many democratizing
societies, media organizations are young and inexperi-
enced, since older, more seasoned journalists are often
associated with the state-controlledmedia of the former
regime. In 2012, the average Myanmar journalist was
25 (International Media Support, 2012). Even chief edi-
tors are unlikely to be much older than 30. The inexperi-
ence of many Myanmar journalists is compounded by a
relative lack of professional training opportunities. Jour-
nalism schools have only recently appeared and places
remain scarce.1 There are not enough qualified media
professionals to fill the demands of Myanmar’s expand-
ing media market. ‘Anyone who wants to can get into
the media’, says a reporter at SkyNet News, herself one
of the few at the satellite television channel with a de-
gree in journalism.2 State-owned media often pay bet-
ter salaries than their commercial competitors and there-
fore attract a larger share of journalism school graduates.
Even at leading commercial newspaper Seven Day News,
fewer than 10 percent of reporters have a professional
qualification.3 Competition for qualified journalists and
editors increased following the government’s decision to
allow private newspapers to resume publishing daily edi-
tions from 1 April 2013.4 A senior editor at Seven Day
News explains:
When we decided to run a daily newspaper, we ad-
vertised for new reporters. But in most cases the ap-
plications we received were not suitable. Some appli-
cants admitted they didn’t even read the newspapers.
We couldn’t find any appropriate candidates to add to
our editorial team.We therefore have to edit our daily
newspaper with the same number of editors who pre-
viously worked at our weekly edition.5
Finding qualified media trainers is another challenge, as
is accessing training materials in Burmese language. In-
ternational media training organizations like BBC Media
Action and Internews are helping to cover the shortfall
in training opportunities by provide professional devel-
opment courses for Myanmar’s journalists both domesti-
cally and overseas. But these courses are oversubscribed
and usually only last a few months.6 Courses provided
by international organizations are generally more acces-
sible for journalists in urban centers and/or with En-
glish language ability.7 During Myanmar’s liberalization
period, a large number of those being trained by the BBC,
Associated Press, Kyodo News and other international
news agencies worked for state-runmedia. It is question-
able whether training journalists to do a better job pro-
moting the military-backed government’s propaganda
was helpful to Myanmar’s democratization (Moe, 2014).
Training opportunities, however, are expanding, with
several international organizations targeting courses at
journalists from Myanmar’s ethnic-minority media.8
In states like Myanmar where foreign media were
taboo, journalists lack not only adequate training op-
portunities, but also access to foreign colleagues from
whom they could learn international professional norms.
By 2012, this situation was improving, as more inter-
national journalists and media organizations began to
receive government permission to work in Myanmar.
But despite growing exposure to international profes-
sional standards, ethical norms remained underdevel-
oped among Myanmar’s media professionals. A journal-
ist at Seven Day News estimates that only half of her col-
leagues understand the meaning of ethical journalism:
In my opinion, 50 percent of journalists behave eth-
ically and 50 percent do not. Many of my junior col-
leagues confuse fact with opinion and often mix the
two in the same article. Sometimes this is not delib-
erate, but a product of their poor education. But in
other cases, journalists deliberately distort the truth
to make their reports more sensational. These jour-
nalists are more interested being popular and getting
1 Author’s interview with Pae Tin Thran editor, December 2013.
2 Author’s interview with SkyNet News reporter, December 2013.
3 Author’s interview with Seven Day News editor, December 2013.
4 All private dailies in Myanmar were shut down in 1964. Until 2013, the authorities allowed publication of state-run dailies, but only permitted the
private media to publish weekly editions (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012).
5 Author’s interview with Seven Day News editor December 2014.
6 Author’s interview with Internews trainer, December 2013.
7 Author’s interview with a Yangon-based media trainer, December 2013.
8 Author’s interview with a representative of Burma News International, December 2014.
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a lot of followers on Facebook than in accurately re-
porting the news.9
Pursuing financial gain, as well as popularity and fame,
can lead journalists to abdicate their professional respon-
sibilities, challenges not accounted for in Voltmer’s the-
ories (Table 1). Several interviewees in this study ac-
knowledged bribery as a persistent problem in Myan-
mar’s newsrooms. For example, an editor at Eleven Me-
dia admits:
When a new restaurant opens, for example, a re-
porter might receivemoney to write a positive review.
Sometimes the reporter refuses the money and tells
their editor. But other times they take the money. It
is difficult to know how often this happens. As an edi-
tor, I read 12 to 16 stories a day. Most of the articles I
receive aren’t good quality and I have to spend a long
time on each one to make it publishable. I therefore
don’t have time to check every fact.10
The ethical and professional dilemmas confrontingMyan-
mar’s editors are compounded by reliance on citizen jour-
nalists with no formal ties to their news organization. In
the current Myanmar market, few private media organi-
zations can afford to establish bureaus outside of major
cities. As a result, Yangon-basednewsroomsoften rely on
citizen journalists to report on events in remote parts of
the country. Lacking any professional education, citizen
journalists often fail to record the information necessary
to make a story publishable. As an editor at Chin World
News explains:
Our entire news organization has only eight full-time
staff. We have to rely on citizen journalists and this
causes a lot of ethical problems. They contact us with
a story, but they have rarely checked who is involved
or why it is happening. They don’t get the details
needed to corroborate a story. We have to tell them
to go and ask follow-up questions. But this delays pub-
lication of the story.We frequently have to trade time-
liness for ethics.11
Journalists’ poor training and inexperience means that
both deliberate and unintended inaccuracies are com-
monplace in the Myanmar media. Inaccuracies can un-
dermine public confidence in the media and provide au-
thoritarian regimes with a pretext for withdrawing hard-
won media freedoms. In Russia, a disregard for profes-
sional standards by many journalists allowed President
Putin to reassert state control over the broadcast me-
dia, a move supported by the majority of Russians (Bur-
rett, 2011). Journalists’ poor understanding of profes-
sional norms can impair the democratization process.
These challenges, absent from Voltmer’s theories (Ta-
ble 1), should be included in theoretical descriptions of
the features of the media during liberalization.
The advent of social media creates new ethical quan-
daries for themedia not considered in Voltmer’s theories.
In 2015, only 12.6 percent of Myanmar’s population had
access to the Internet (Internet World Stats, 2016). But
already social media had become a key news source for
urban residents. As one editor explains:
For young people in particular, news shared by friends
on Facebook is their main source of information. Peo-
ple don’t discriminate between information produced
by media professionals or by amateurs. They do not
question the origins or authenticity of what they
read online.12
Several journalists interviewed for this study raised the
related issues of fake news and a lack of capacity for criti-
cal thinking among audiences as challenges for theMyan-
mar media. Interviewees stated that audiences were
more likely to trust information posted online by their
friends than news appearing in the professional media:
The media have a bad reputation. For decades there
was only the state media and they were propaganda
organs for the government. In post-authoritarian
states like Myanmar people tend to trust their friends
over institutions, and that includes the media.13
Myanmar’s multiple ethnic conflicts are the most com-
mon theme of fake news, both online and in the tra-
ditional media. Journalists lament that new media free-
doms won since 2012 have often exacerbate ethnic ten-
sions. Posts on social media precipitated some of the
most violent clashes of recent years. Anti-Muslim riots in
Mandalay in July 2014, for example, were sparked by a
post on Facebook alleging the rape of a Buddhist girl by
her Muslim employer. Although the story proved untrue,
it quickly went viral, triggering communal violence within
24 hours of posting (Crane, 2014). More attention must
be paid to the potential problems posed by social media
in theories of the media’s role in democratization. Audi-
ences’ ability to assess the reliability of online informa-
tion is a problemeverywhere. But it is particularly acute in
transitional societies, where authoritarian governments
discourage the teaching of critical thinking skills.
False reporting is a problem on both sides in the
Buddhist–Muslim conflict in Rakhine.14 Owing to prob-
lems of access and personal security, it can be difficult
for Yangon-based media organizations to verify reports
from Myanmar’s far-flung regions. At Seven Day News a
9 Author’s interview with Seven Day News reporter, December 2014.
10 Author’s interview with Eleven Media editor, December 2013.
11 Author’s interview with Chin World News editor, December 2013.
12 Author’s Interview with board member of Pen International, March 2015.
13 Author’s interview with a Yangon-based media trainer, September 2015.
14 Author’s interview with a Yangon-based international media agency correspondent, December 2013.
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lack of verification often leads to editors being forced to
pull stories from Rakhine:
When a story has a religious or ethnic component
we are especially careful about what we write, as we
don’t want to fuel the conflict. Many times we decide
not to print a story because we can’t be sure of the
facts, or because we can’t access opinions on both
sides. It is particularly difficult for us to talk to the Ro-
hingya [Muslim] community in Rakhine, since many
of them live in government-run refugee camps, which
are closed to the media. If we can’t print a balanced
story, then we don’t print any story at all.15
Editors may also reject a story on inter-ethnic violence to
prevent a backlash from sectarian readers. An editor at
Seven Day News explains:
Whenever we write about the conflict in Rakhine we
get a lot of angry letters and phone calls, especially
from the Arakan (Rakhine Buddhist) side. Following
criticism of our reporting on the violence in Rakhine in
2012, we decided to give the issue less prominence.16
Self-censorship of this kind can lead to a dearth of bal-
anced information on the causes and consequences of
inter-ethnic violence. When balanced reporting is scarce,
biased accounts go unchallenged and the probability
that the public will be misinformed increases. Several
journalists interviewed for this study complained of cal-
culated pro-Buddhist coverage of the 2012 Rakhine con-
flict by much of the Myanmar media.17 As one journalist
at Eleven Media said of his colleagues:
Most reporters are Buddhists and they are patriotic.
Their personal nationalism is reflected in what they
write. This isn’t only true of reporting on the Rohingya
issue, but also of coverage of international affairs, es-
pecially bi-lateral relations with China.18
Although patriotic fervor is not uncommon among jour-
nalists in other places at times of national crisis—for ex-
ample in the US following the terrorist attacks on 9/11—
it is particularly dangerous in the context of volatile inter-
ethnic tensions (Kull, Clay, & Evans, 2003; Levy & Bug-
ingo, 2001). One-sided reporting not only obscures au-
diences’ understanding of the issues, but also increases
the probability of further violence.
Other interviewees in this study attribute biased cov-
erage of ethnic tensions to low educational standards
among media professionals. Some argue that biased re-
porting stems from journalists’ poor understanding of
media framing.19 Framing theory contends that the me-
dia focus audience attention on certain events and then
place them within a field of meaning. It suggests that
how something is presented to the audience influences
the choices peoplemake about how to process that infor-
mation (Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974; Scheufele, 1999).
In Myanmar, by offhandedly using loaded nouns such
as ‘Bangladeshi’ or ‘immigrant’ to describe the Rohingya,
journalists unconsciously framed the Muslim-Buddhist
conflict in nationalist terms.20
Voltmer’s theories identify significant political bias
as a feature of media systems undergoing liberalization
whether the origins of political change are bottom–up,
top–down or external. Her work has less to say about
bias arising from ethnic loyalties that may cut across
political affiliations. Sectarian biases in media report-
ing are an impediment to liberalization and should be
included in theoretical frameworks. The generals who
seized power in Myanmar in 1962 justified their rule
as necessary to hold together a country fractured by
ethnic strife. Several interviewees for this study raised
suspicions that government provocateurs were behind
outbreaks of sectarian violence in central Myanmar in
2013.21 Fresh sectarian violence adds credence to the
military’s insistence on remaining a prop to Myanmar’s
civilian government. But despite harboring suspicions
that themilitarywere stoking inter-ethnic tensions to jus-
tify retaining power beyond 2015, the majority of jour-
nalists were too afraid to publish such concerns.22
4.2. Political Parallelism
Voltmer’s theories predict that when liberalization is ini-
tiated from below, the independent media will exhibit
a strong pro-opposition bias. But when the process is
top–down, the media are more likely to align with fac-
tions within the ruling regime. The media are drawn into
the escalating conflict between government hard and
soft liners over the pace of liberalization. If change is
precipitated by external pressure, then exiled and for-
eign media embolden and widen opposition networks
by providing information that challenges the regime’s
propaganda (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, given the multi-
directional sources of its liberalization,Myanmar’smedia
displayed elements of all the features listed above.
In Myanmar, as in other authoritarian states, gov-
ernment persecution of the press led journalists to join
pro-democracy groups. During the rule of the military
15 Author’s interview with Seven Day News editor, December 2013.
16 Author’s interview with Seven Day News editor, December 2013.
17 Riots in June 2012 between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhist Rakhine killed approximately 170 and displacing roughly 140,000 mostly Rohingyas.
18 Author’s interview with Eleven Media editor, December 2013.
19 Author’s interview withMyanmar Journalists Network representative, December 2013.
20 The Rohingyas’ exact roots are debated, but many likely settled in Burma in the nineteenth century, having migrated from modern-day Bangladesh
following expansion of the British Empire. Today, the Rohingya are excluded from the 135 ethnic groups the government recognizes asMyanmar citizens.
21 Author’s interviews with journalists atMizzima, Seven Day News andMyanmar Freedom Daily, December 2013.
22 Author’s interview with Street View Journal journalist, December 2014.
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junta, journalists languished in the country’s 43 prisons.
Even after political reforms began in 2011, the impris-
onment of journalists continued (Reporters Sans Fron-
tières, 2012). Harassed by the state, it is difficult for jour-
nalists in transitional states to remain neutral observers
of political events. Many of Myanmar’s journalists are
members of the NLD or the ‘88 movement’ (Pidduck,
2012).23 This is especially true of many of the former-
media-in-exile that began returning to Myanmar follow-
ing the start of reforms in 2011.24 By engaging in politi-
cal struggles against state leaders, journalist-activists pro-
vided the authorities with justification for restricting me-
dia freedom. Differences in attitudes between themedia
and state elites over the proper functioning of the me-
dia have led to the rolling back of political reforms and
media freedom in Russia, Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala, Sri
Lanka, Pakistan, the Philippines and Iraq (Reporters Sans
Frontières, 2011/2012).
A politicized media, however, is not incompatible
with democracy. In their seminal work on comparative
media systems, Hallin and Mancini identify a ‘Polarized
Pluralism Model’ of the media that is dominant in South-
ern Europe. Under this model, political parallelism, in-
strumentalism and commentary-orientated journalism
dominate themedia system (2004, p. 67). External plural-
ism guarantees that a wide range of political voices can
be heard in the public sphere. The rule of law ensures the
media freedom from state harassment. But in Myanmar
undermilitary-backed rule, oppositionmedia did not face
a level playing field with their state-run competitors. Fur-
thermore, pluralism was limited by the legal framework
in which the media operated, providing state authorities
with a choice of methods for silencing their critics.
Despite some significant political reforms, at the time
of the 2015 elections, Myanmar was far from a democratic
system. Many journalists therefore contended that it was
inappropriate to hold them to the same standards of po-
litical neutrality that characterize the media of the estab-
lisheddemocracies in Europe andNorthAmerica. A Yangon-
based media trainer uses a football metaphor to explain:
Politics in Myanmar is not like in the UK or the US. In
the US there are two teams, the Republicans and the
Democrats. They compete in the political field where
there are rules structuring the game. But in Myanmar
we have teams but no agreed rules of the game. First
we must build the institutions that structure political
competition. This means we must support the pro-
democracy movement. Now is not the time for me-
dia neutrality. The political system is not neutral; it is
stacked in favor of the regime.25
How much to accommodate President Thein Sein and
other soft liners within his military-backed government
was an issue that divided Myanmar’s media. Journalists
were divided over towhat extent they could trust themil-
itary’s commitment to liberalization. Echoing views ex-
pressed by many interviewees, one editor at The Voice
supported the idea of a negotiated political settlement
with the military, citing the example of South Africa’s
transition in the 1990s:
A lasting change can only be built slowly and will
have to involve the military. I’m not pro-military, but
they are a fact of life. A permanent settlement re-
quires a compromise on all sides. NelsonMandela un-
derstood this well. He promoted reconciliation rather
than retribution and South Africa today is a consoli-
dated democracy. The opposition in Myanmar must
learn that politics is about compromise. When the op-
position media aggressively attack the government, it
makes the military insecure.26
A member of the IPC agreed, arguing that excessive me-
dia criticismof themilitary undermined the likely success
of the liberalization process:
It is hard for journalists to imagine the military as vul-
nerable because for decades themedia have been the
dictatorship’s victims. But in starting the liberalization
process, themilitary are a bit like amole coming out of
his hole for the first time. If he feels safe, he will come
out a little further. But if he gets hit on the head, he
will run back inside. The military feel like the media
are hitting them on the head.27
Others in the media disagreed, believing that liberaliza-
tion was aimed at strengthening the military’s hold on
power rather than a genuine transition to democracy.
A journalist at the formerly exiled satellite broadcaster
the Democratic Voice of Burma summed up the views of
many of his colleagues:
The military are undertaking reforms to protect them-
selves. If you are in any doubt, look at how they have
guaranteed themselves 25 percent of seats in par-
liament. This gives them a controlling stake in who
is president after 2015.28 The military won’t give us
23 In 1988 demands for an end to the military dictatorship in Myanmar spilled out from university campuses onto the streets, led by a group known as
the ‘88 Generation Students’ Group. The movement was brutally suppressed and those who were caught were sentenced to decades in prison. Some
of those who escaped overseas went on to work in the media in exile.
24 Author’s interview with Interim Press Council (IPC) member, December 2014.
25 Author’s interview with Yangon-based media trainer, September 2015.
26 Author’s interview with The Voice editor, December 2014.
27 Author’s interview with IPC member, September 2015.
28 The president ofMyanmar is nominated by parliamentarians, not directly elected by the public. Three committees, known collectively as the Presidential
Electoral College, are formed fromamongupper and lower house parliamentarians. Oneof the three committees ismadeup entirely ofmilitary-appointed
lawmakers. Each committee nominates one candidate for the presidency. Members of the Electoral College then vote for one of the three candidates to
become president. The candidate with the most votes takes the presidency and the unsuccessful candidates become vice-presidents (Reuters, 2015).
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democracy. We must fight for it. They promised de-
mocratization in 1990 and we are still waiting.29
In line with Voltmer’s theories (Table 1), interviewees
who had lived in exile were more likely to favor un-
restrained struggle against the government than those
who had remained in Myanmar. By dividing her theories
into three distinct models, however, Voltmer fails to cap-
ture the significance of disagreements among journalists
over accommodation with the existing regime. Such divi-
sions have allowed authoritarian governments in other
places to divide and rule the media (Burrett, 2011).
To build mutual trust, in December 2014, members
of the IPC attended the first joint workshop between
the military and media to exchange ideas about build-
ing an information system that works better for both
parties (Zaw, 2014). The IPC explained to General Min
Aung Hlaing, the then commander-in-chief of the Myan-
mar Armed Forces who attended the meeting, that me-
dia reporting is often inadvertently biased against the
regime due to a lack of freedom of information. Repre-
sentatives of the military and their civilian colleagues in
government were reluctant to talk to journalists. When
reporters could not get a quote from official sources, sto-
ries often seemed one-sided.30 The IPC advised the mil-
itary to provide more points of contact for journalists in
order to improve the public image of the armed forces.
Authoritarian authorities’ inability to adapt to the de-
mands of the liberalizing media is another factor not in-
cluded in Voltmer’s models.
Journalists interviewed for this study were not only
critical of government secrecy, but also of suspicion of
the media among Myanmar’s opposition parties, espe-
cially the NLD. Following the end of pre-publication cen-
sorship, photos of Aung San Suu Kyi appeared on newspa-
per front pages almost daily—something previously un-
thinkable when her name could not even be mentioned
in the press. But most journalists interviewed for this
study complained that getting ‘the Lady’ and her party to
comment on the news could be difficult. After decades of
government harassment and attempts at infiltration by
state agents, the NLD leadership was wary of strangers:
It takes a long time to win the trust of NLD press offi-
cers. Even today, government informers try to get in-
side the party. It is not surprising that they are para-
noid, but it makes it hard to get access [to the party].
Only trusted journalists are invited to interview the
Lady.31
The NLD’s reluctance to talk to journalists outside their
select circle inhibited reporting on the party’s policies
and activities in the run up to the 2015 elections. Jour-
nalists who criticize the NLD, even with the aim of help-
ing the party improve its operations, found themselves
ostracized. The following quotation is typical of the sen-
timents expressed by many interviewees:
If I criticize the NLD I will be the common enemy of ev-
eryone. Sometimes I am more afraid of the NLD than
of the military. If I attack the president and the mil-
itary, my colleagues and readers will approve. They
hate the military and are ready to believe the worst
of them. But if I criticize the NLD, the party and its
supporters will punish me.32
Many interviewees also cited over-centralization and a
dearth of professional staff as factors hampering the
NLD’s media operation:
Inside the NLD, the Lady decides everything. Icons do
not necessarily make good managers. NLD press con-
ferences are often very chaotic and unprofessional.
They don’t know how to use the media to their best
advantage….A lot of journalists want to help the NLD,
but they don’t invite us to press conferences.33
Several others accuse the NLD of deliberate obfuscation
motivated by political expediency:
The Lady is sometimes slow to comment on events
because she doesn’t want to lose support, for exam-
ple, over religious conflicts. The NLD focus too much
on political issues, like changing the constitution [to
allow Aung San Suu Kyi to be president] rather than
on the concerns of ordinary people.34
Some journalists also felt the NLD did not do enough to
oppose flawed new legislation giving themilitary-backed
government continued oversight of the media:
We received very little support from opposition par-
ties in parliament in our strugglewith the government
over theMedia Bill. The Lady’s attention was on other
matters and NLD MPs take their lead from her.35
Strong political support for the NLD among the indepen-
dent media was not always reciprocated. As elections
approached, the military-back government was bent on
retaining the legal means to restrain media freedom.
Without support from the NLD in parliament, journal-
ist groups possessed few mechanisms through which
to oppose legislation aimed at maintaining state influ-
ence over the media. Opposition parties’ unwillingness
29 Author’s interview with Democratic Voice of Burma presenter, December 2014.
30 Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2014.
31 Author’s interview with a Yangon-based international media agency correspondent, December 2013.
32 Author’s interview with Yangon-based print media journalist, July 2015.
33 Author’s interview with Yangon-based media trainer and journalist, December 2014.
34 Author’s interview with The Chronicle editor, December 2014.
35 Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2014.
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to work with unfamiliar sympathizers in the independent
media and the failure of pro-democracy parliamentari-
ans to support new liberalizing media laws are factors
not considered in Voltmer’s theories.
4.3. The State
As is expected based on Voltmer’s theories, when liberal-
ization is largely initiated from above, the political needs
of the ruling regime determined the pace and scope of
the new freedoms granted to the Myanmar media from
2011 (Table 1). Restrictive media laws remained intact,
with journalistic freedom granted at the discretion of the
government, rather than by legal statute. In Myanmar,
liberalization did not include a new freedom of informa-
tion law. Journalists complained that government min-
istry information bureaus were under-staffed and diffi-
cult to contact.36 Given the brutal and secretive culture
of the junta that ruled Myanmar for 50 years, despite
liberalization, government officials continued to fear get-
ting into trouble if they talked to the media. Like the rest
of society, bureaucrats are traumatized from living un-
der a dictatorship.37 The vague wording of national se-
curity laws and other laws meant that bureaucrats often
felt unsure about what information they could release to
the public. Rather than getting into trouble for releasing
restricted information, bureaucrats preferred to release
nothing. Even when the information pursued by journal-
ists was benign, bureaucrats often stayed silent.38
A culture of secrecy, distrust and fear meant govern-
ment ministries were slow to respond to breaking news
stories. In this regard, the military-back government was
often ‘its own worst enemy’.39 Prior to the 2015 elec-
tions, the government and military were frequently slow
in commenting on stories about ethnic insurgencies. The
government’s opponentsweremuch faster to respond to
media requests for information:
Following an incident, the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA) will speak to the media within hours, while it
takes the government days to respond. In the old days,
the government could release days-old information
and no one knew. But now that SIM cards are inex-
pensive and the Internet is more pervasive, informa-
tion comes out almost immediately on social media.
The first version of a story that appears sets public
opinion. The government is very bad at getting their
story out to the public. Unfortunately, they usually
blame the messenger, accusing the media of being
one-sided about Myanmar’s civil wars.40
Although it was often the military-backed government’s
secrecy rather than journalistic bias that led to imbal-
anced reporting of ethnic insurgencies, the authorities
used this imbalance to justify cracking down on media
freedom.41
Government secrecy took a step backwards in August
2014 when hard line Information Minister Ye Htut re-
placed moderate Aung Kyi (August 2012–July 2014).42 In-
terviewees for this study stated that YeHtut called editors
to criticize their reporting more commonly than his pre-
decessor, pressuring them to change their editorial line.
Editors at various newspapers also complained that Ye
Htut was less willing to work with the media to solve dis-
putes between the press and authorities than Aung Kyi.
Several interviewees speculated that Ye Htut had been
appointed to intimidate themedia into submission ahead
of the 2015 election. Many more journalists were prose-
cuted and jailed in 2014 and 2015 than in any other year
since liberalization began (Nyein, 2014; Stout, 2014).
As Voltmer anticipates when political change is top–
down, Myanmar’s military-backed government retained
a variety of legal means to silence and intimate the me-
dia (Table 1). Vague national security laws, such as the
1923 Official Secrets Act, the 1950 Emergency Provisions
Act, the 2000 Internet Act, and the 2004 Electronic Trans-
action Act, ensured that censorship could be legally en-
forced and journalists punished for non-compliance. The
authorities had broad discretion in deciding whetherme-
dia reports posed a ‘threat to national security, domestic
tranquility, or racial harmony’ (Crane, 2014).While these
laws remained mostly unenforced during the reform pe-
riod from 2012 to 2013, they were utilized as mecha-
nisms of harassment more frequently in 2014 and 2015.
In July 2014, the courts sentenced four reporters and
the CEO of current affairs magazine Unity Weekly to ten
years in jail with hard labor for publishing an article al-
leging that Myanmar’s military was operating a secret
chemical weapons factory in central Myanmar (Commit-
tee to Protect Journalists, 2014b). The government used
the colonial-era Official Secrets Act to convict the jour-
nalists rather than prosecuting them through the new
Media Law, passed in March 2014. The new law empow-
ered prosecutors to decide whether to prosecute jour-
nalists using theMedia Law itself—which allows for fines
but not imprisonment formisdemeanors—orMyanmar’s
more punitive defamation and national security laws.43
In 2014, theMinistry of Information took legal action
against two media outlets for defamation. Action was
taken against an article onPresident Thein Sein published
by the weekly journal the Myanmar Herald and against
a story by Daily Eleven alleging misuse of funds by the
36 Author’s interview with Irrawaddy editor, December 2014.
37 Author’s interview with The Voice journalist, September 2015.
38 Author’s interview withMyanmar Freedom Daily reporter, December 2013.
39 Author’s interview withMyanmar Freedom Daily reporter, December 2013.
40 Author’s interview withMizzima editor, December 2014.
41 Author’s interview with Yangon Times journalist, December 2013.
42 Author’s interview with The Voice editor, December 2014.
43 Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2014.
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Ministry of Information in its purchase of printing presses
(Nyein, 2014). Minor laws were also used to harass jour-
nalists. Officials increasingly used the threat of criminal
trespassing charges to prevent reporters probing their
activities. In April 2014, a DVB journalist was sentenced
to one year in jail on charges of ‘trespassing’ and ‘dis-
turbing an on-duty civil servant’ while reporting on the
seemingly innocuous subject of scholarships awarded to
Myanmar students by a Japanese foundation (Commit-
tee to Protect Journalists, 2014c). Cases such as this un-
doubtedly create anxiety within the media community
and influence what journalists do and do not report.
In a clear step backwards for media freedom, in
March 2014 parliament passed both the Media Act and
the Printers and Publishers Regulation Act giving theMin-
istry of Information ultimate power over what news was
permissible to print and sole authority to issue and re-
voke news publication licenses. Both bills dashed jour-
nalists’ hopes that new legislation would liberate the
media from state intervention. The Printers and Publish-
ers Regulation Act, similar to the previous junta’s cen-
sorship guidelines, banned the publication of materials
that ‘insult religion’, ‘disturb the rule of law’, ‘violate
the constitution’, ‘incite unrest’ or ‘harm ethnic unity’
(Crispin, 2014). The controversial Act, drafted by theMin-
istry of Information without consultation with journalist
groups, also created a new registrar position with exten-
sive powers to withhold or revoke publishing licenses.
Fear of losing their licenses inevitably encouraged self-
censorship among editors, especially in reporting on sen-
sitive topics such as ongoing inter-ethnic tensions and
land development.44
Government-imposed travel restrictions further im-
peded reporting on Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts dur-
ing the liberalization period. Journalists were typically
barred from areas of unrest. Even when not officially
banned, it can be dangerous for journalists to travel to
conflict zones, as illustrated by the death of freelancer
Aung Kyaw Naing, who died in suspicious circumstances
while in military custody after reporting from rebel held
territory in Mon State (Committee to Protect Journal-
ists, 2014a). Independent media even faced restrictions
on covering outwardly uncontroversial events, such as
a visit by the King of Norway to Mandalay in Decem-
ber 2014. Journalists from The Voice, Seven Day News,
and DVB were barred from sites along the Irrawaddy
River, where dozens of poor families had earlier been
evicted to avoid blighting the landscape during the king’s
visit.45 It was not uncommon for the authorities to limit
access to diplomatic events and government ceremonies
to state-run media to avoid critical coverage. In March
2014, independent media were barred from the first-
ever press conference by army chief General Min Aung
Hlaing, who took questions only from state-owned out-
lets (Mann, 2014).
As Voltmer’s theories predict when liberalization
comes in response to external pressures, Myanmar’s
military-backed government also clamped down on for-
eign journalists’ access (Table 1). In February 2014, the
Ministry of Information reduced the duration of foreign
reporters’ visas from three months with multiple entries
to one month with a single entry. The move likely came
in reaction to international media criticism of govern-
ment treatment of Rohingya refugees displaced follow-
ing ethnic clashes in Rakhine in 2012. In some cases, in-
ternational reporters were denied entry altogether. In
March 2014, for example, Time journalist Hannah Beech
was refused a visa, probably in response to her cover
story the previous year featuring a radical Myanmar Bud-
dhistMonkwith the caption ‘The Face of Buddhist Terror’
(Crispin, 2014).
4.4. The Market
In Myanmar, consistent with Volmter’s theories of top–
down liberalization, the state continued to dominate
the media sector despite marketization (Table 1). The
independent media that appeared after licensing laws
were relaxed depend largely on business elites with gov-
ernment connections for their economic survival. The
opposition-operated and foreign-funded media associ-
atedwith bottom–up and externally-driven liberalization
were few in number and limited in influence inMyanmar.
Table 3 sets out the financial structures and political con-
nections of Myanmar’s main media outlets at the start
of 2015.
Prior to the 2015 election, state authorities showed
few signs of giving up their controlling influence over the
media. The state retained majority control over the tele-
vision sector, the most popular source of news among
urban dwellers. MRTV-4 (owned by the Forever Group)
and SkyNet (owned by the Shwe Than Lwin Company)
were ostensibly private networks, but were owned by
allies of the regime. The formerly exiled satellite broad-
caster DVB had a small but growing audience as elec-
tions approached.46 In August 2015, parliament ratified
a new Broadcasting Law, enabling private companies to
enter the broadcast market for the first time. Broad-
casters were previously required to partner with the
state-ownedMyanmar Radio and Television (MRTV). The
Law, however, maintained government control over the
broadcasting sector by granting the president power to
appoint members of the new Broadcast Council autho-
rized to issue and revoke broadcast licenses (Freedom
House, 2016).
State-owned media also continued to dominate in
the print sector. The country’s three state-run dailies—
which operated as mouthpieces for the regime—had a
circulation of more than 320,000, while the more popu-
lar private newspapers only sold about 80,000 copies per
44 Author’s interview with The Chronicle editor, December 2014.
45 Author’s interview with The Voice editor, December 2014.
46 Author’s interview with DVB editor, December 2014.
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Table 3. Ownership and political connections of main non-state news media (TV and Print), January 2015. Source: Based
on information from author’s interviews.
Outlet Name/Type Parent Company Funding/ Ownership Politics
7 Days News Information Matrix Thaung Su Nyein Politically objective despite CEO being the
son of ex-Foreign Affairs Minister Win Aung
(1998–2004). Win Aung was purged from the
government in 2004 and sent to Insein prison,
where he died in 2009.
(Weekly & Daily Print) Co.Ltd (CEO)
Democracy Today Yangon Media U Ko Ko Close to regime. Promoted President Thein
Sein. Tabloid.(Weekly & Daily Print) Group Swe Thanj Lwin
(not confirmed)
Democratic Voice Free Voice of the Anti-regime, pro-democracy and human
rights. Based in Thailand and run by Burmese
expatriates. Began radio broadcasts from
Oslo in 1992. Satellite TV from 2005. In 2012
established operations inside Myanmar as
exiled journalists returned home.
of Burma (TV) Netherlands
National
Endowment for
Democracy
Eleven (Weekly & Eleven Media Than Htut Aung CEO has strong editorial influence. Formerly
close to NLD. Given Media of the Year award
by Reporters without Borders in 2011.
Daily Print) Group (CEO)
Irrawaddy (Weekly Irrawaddy Aung Zaw Owner a former activist who left Myanmar in
1988. Former media in exile (from 1990).
Returned to Myanmar in 2012. Supportive
of NLD.
& Monthly Print Publishing Group
English & Burmese)
Mizzima (Daily & Mizzima Media Serge Pun Politically independent, former media in exile.
Co-owner Soe Myint is a former activist who
hijacked a Thai passenger plane in 1990s to
publicize Myanmar’s struggle against its
military regime. Co-owner Serge Pun ranked
No.38 in Forbes Asia’s 2013 rich list
(Chairman SPA Group).
Monthly Print) Group Soe Myint
Sonny Swe
MRTV-4 (TV) Forever Group Win Maw Generally avoids political reporting. Owner
Win Maw has government connections.
Pyi Myanmar Swesone Media Tin Tun Oo Politically close to regime. In 2010, owner Tin
Tun Oo stood as a parliamentary candidate
for the military-backed Union Solidarity and
Development Party (USDP). Close to former
Information Minister Kyaw Hsan. Tabloid.
(Weekly & Daily Print) Group
Skynet (Satellite TV) Shwe Than Lwin Kyaw Win Some pro-regime bias. Owner Kyaw Win has
government connections.Company
Snap Shot (Weekly Myat Khine co- Pro-regime. Co-owner Myat Khine close to
former Information Minister Kyaw Hsan. No
current close government connections.
Tabloid focusing on entertainment news.
Criticized for sensational coverage of
Rakhine conflict.
Print) owner (Editor and
co-owner)
Aung Kyaw Oo
(Financier)
Sun Ray (Weekly, Moe Heina Anti-government. Rumored co-owner Moe
Heina former student activist and exile. Now
US citizen. Htaw Kywe also former student
activist.
name changed to (not confirmed)
Asian Light, 2014) Htaw Kywe
(not confirmed).
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Table 3. Ownership and political connections of main non-state news media (TV and Print), January 2015. Source: Based
on information from author’s interviews. (Cont.)
Outlet Name/Type Parent Company Funding/ Ownership Politics
The Myanmar Times Myanmar Ross Dunkley Formerly considered close to the regime, as
part owned by Sonny Swe (See Mizzima), son
of General Thein Swe.
(Weekly Print Consolidate Media (49 percent)
English Language) Thein Tun
(51 percent)
The Street View Toe Naing Mann Owner son of Shwe Mann (Speaker of the
lower house 2011–2016), former General and
leading figure in the military government.
Not very political, focused on entertainment.
(Weekly Print)
The Voice Living Color Media Wife of late Nay Political independent, but often critical of the
government.(Weekly & Daily Group Win Maung
Print) Kyaw Min Swe
(Editor)
Yangon Times Yangon Media U Ko Ko Chairman former Secretary of MWJA
(Myanmar Writers and Journalist
Association), which was close to the Ministry
of Information. From 2011 gained greater
independence.
(Weekly & Daily Group (Chairman)
Print)
day.47Private outlets could not compete in terms of eco-
nomic resources, distribution networks or cover price.
Operating in a poor country with a modest advertising
market,many privatemedia failed to survive. Advertisers
often preferred to work with higher-circulation state-run
outlets than with the privately-owned media. In 2014, fi-
nancial difficulties forced three privately owned dailies
to close within a month (Cunningham, 2014). A lack of
business acumen among those running private newspa-
pers is another factor hampering their success. Trained
managers are scarce and many editors are former polit-
ical prisoners or exiled activists with no business expe-
rience.48 Financial backers willing to suffer losses while
a newspaper establishes a foothold in the market are
hard to find. As in other liberalizing states, those with
the deepest pockets were often cronies of the regime
(Becker, 2004; Heng, 2002; Porto & Hallin, 2009). De-
pending on business elites with connections to the gov-
ernment entailed editorial compromise at best. Private-
media owners used their political leverage to extract eco-
nomic and regulatory favors from government benefac-
tors in exchange for turning a blind eye to official cor-
ruption and failed programs.49 A few lucky outlets, such
as DVB and The Chronicle secured funding from interna-
tional NGOs, but such sources of finance are limited.50
Ties to financial and business interests have re-
stricted what Myanmar’s journalists can report about
economics as well as politics. Traditionally, the watch-
dog role of the media is defined as behavior that reveals
abuses in the exercise of state power and ignores the role
of the press as a defense against exploitation in the pri-
vate sphere—most notably with regard to the economy
(Chomsky & Herman, 1988; Donohue, 1995). Clearly, the
media should act as a source of redress against the abuse
of all forms of power. But in Myanmar, privately owned
media outlets have refrained from investigating the ac-
tivities of the conglomerates to which they belong. At
SkyNet, for example, a journalist reports being instructed
by editors to refrain from investigating misdemeanors by
businesses within the same holding company.51 A jour-
nalist at Mandalay FM was told not to report on any
topics that might jeopardize company profits or adver-
tising revenues.52
When company profits are not in jeopardy, Myan-
mar’s media have shown a predilection for sensation-
alism and scandal. Growing competition in the media
market has encouraged tabloidization and an empha-
sis on infotainment over serious news. Myanmar is not
alone. In the West, the search for profits in an increas-
ingly crowded market has led to a decline in news qual-
ity (Barnett, 1998; Postman, 1986). In democratizing
states like Myanmar, where scandal and gossip were
previously forbidden, audiences have become transfixed
by ‘yellow journalism’.53 When tabloid newspaper The
Sun Rays (Thuriya Naywon) hit the newsstands in 2013,
its mixture of colorful cover pages, scandal and sensa-
47 Author’s interview with IPC member, September 2015.
48 Author’s interview with Sun Ray editor, December 2013.
49 Author’s interview with People’s Age reporter, December 2013.
50 Author’s interviews with DVB presenter and The Chronicle editor, December 2013.
51 Author’s interview with SkyNet News reporter, December 2013.
52 Author’s interview withMandalay FM reporter, December 2013.
53 Author’s interview withMyanmar Times editor, December 2013.
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tionalism quickly made it one of the highest circulation
weeklies in Yangon. Its no-holds-barred coverage of cor-
ruption among high-ranking officials and their cronies
in the business elite attracted a wide audience. But
the newspaper’s personal attacks and unsubstantiated
claims quickly landed The Sun Ray in legal hot water.
In November 2013, powerful tycoon Tay Za accused the
newspaper of defamation after it ran a front-page story
with his photo under the headline ‘Cronies Should Jump
into the Andaman Sea’ (Weng & Zaw, 2013). The follow-
ing month, the Ministry of Information asked the IPC to
take action against the newspaper for its ‘unethical yel-
low journalism’ and ‘hate speech’ (Snaing, 2013). Jour-
nalists interviewed for this study were equally critical of
The Sun Ray and other tabloids for bringing their profes-
sion into disrepute. The following quotation from an Ir-
rawaddy journalist is typical of many:
The Sun Ray is 50 percent gossip. It provides no evi-
dence for its accusations. Its unethical behavior dam-
ages public confidence in the media and allows the
government to say we need restrictions on what jour-
nalists can report.54
Other journalists expressed concern that the success
of The Sun Ray and fellow tabloids, such as Snap Shot,
would encouragemore newspapers to adopt a sensation-
alist style.
Some interviewees expressed suspicions that more
sinistermotives lay behind the tabloidization of the press.
Although it appeared that by exposing state corruption
tabloids were living up to their watchdog role, such
stories concealed political biases, as a member of the
IPC explains:
Look closely and you will realize that some newspa-
pers only attackmembers of a particular factionwithin
the regime. Their victims are carefully chosen.55
As is predicted by Voltmer’s theories when liberalization
is predominately top–down, ownership of much of the
Myanmar media by figures close to the military-backed
regime means that reporting on government corruption
was often a by-product of intra-elite conflict rather than
the result of a commitment to the public interest (Ta-
ble 1). Similar ‘information wars’ between competing
elites in post-Soviet Russia badly damaged public confi-
dence in the media. Journalists’ complicity in the infor-
mation wars of the 1990s strengthened public support
for President Putin’s increase in state control of the me-
dia from 2000 (Burrett, 2011). Although often an obsta-
cle to successful democratization, the tabloidization of
the media that invariably accompanies liberalization is
not included in Voltmer’s theories (Table 1).
My recommendations for additions and amend-
ments to Voltmer’s theories based on my analysis of the
Myanmar media are summarized in Table 4 and in the
concluding section below.
5. Conclusion
During the five-year liberalization period preceding par-
liamentary elections in November 2015, to a greater or
lesser extent, all of themedia features and functions pre-
dicted by Voltmer’s theories were present in Myanmar.
Looking again at Table 1, the Myanmar media strongly
exhibited features associated with both top–down and
bottom–up liberalization. Although less significant, el-
ements derived from externally-induced liberalization
were also present. Programs broadcast from abroad by,
for example, DVB, Radio Free Asia and the BBC were
popular. But there is little evidence that exposure to
transnational media content by itself mobilized popular
resistance to the regime. News from overseas of inter-
national solidary with Myanmar’s pro-democracy move-
ment, however, may have helped strength the resolve of
opposition activists in their struggle against the regime
(Puddington, 2000).
Although Volmer’s tripartite theory is helpful in an-
alyzing the media’ role in Myanmar’s liberalization, the
complex causes of the country’s political transforma-
tion suggest that the distinctions between her three dis-
creet models are becoming obsolete. Voltmer acknowl-
edges that democratic transformations often contain el-
ements from more than one model. Innovations in on-
line media, however, are accelerating interdependence
between the forces driving liberalization. The presence
of social media brings greater potential for grassroots
participation and coordination that are part of bottom–
up transformations (Krastev & Holmes, 2012). Growing
Internet access provides foreign and exiled media alter-
natives to state-run news, increasing the role of exter-
nal forces in pushing domestic change. Furthermore, pro-
democracy activists can use online tools to draw global
attention to government brutality and to pressure the in-
ternational community to support their calls for democ-
racy. External pressure and domestic activism can con-
vince ruling regimes to initiate top–down reforms. Given
the growing interdependence between the forces driv-
ing liberalization, it may be better to collapse Voltmer’s
three models into one.
Applying Voltmer’s models to the Myanmar media
highlights several omissions in her theories. In Table 4,
I recommend additional features for inclusion in each di-
mension of themedia system, regardless of the source of
liberalization. The features I identify cut across Voltmer’s
three models. Myanmar’s experience suggests these ad-
ditional features are factors potentially influencing the
media’s actions, regardless of whether liberalization is
precipitated by bottom–up, top–down or external forces.
Voltmer’s focus on politics as the catalyst for change
leads her to omit some of the practical challenges that
54 Author’s interview with Irrawaddy journalist, December 2013.
55 Author’s interview with IPC member, December 2013.
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Table 4. Amended features and functions of the media system during liberalization (recommendations for addition are
highlighted in blue).
Bottom–up Liberalization Top–down Liberalization Externally-Influenced Liberalization
Ag
en
cy
Pr
of
es
sio
na
lis
m
Partisanship prioritized over
objective and accurate
reporting
Content of oppositional media
produced by activists rather
than journalists
Ritualized rhetoric of the state
media replaced by more
accessible language
Journalists serve the political
and economic interests of
financial backers rather than
the public interest
Prioritizing of information
delegitimizing the regime and
rallying popular resistance
Outsiders often misjudge the
domestic reception and
interpretation of information they
provide
Addition:
Poor understanding of professional norms leading to inaccuracies and bias (intended and unintended):
problem exacerbated by prevalence of amateur and anonymous writers (especially on social media)
Deliberate bias motivated by ethnic loyalties
St
ru
ct
ur
e
Pa
ra
lle
lis
m
Close relationship between
journalists and the opposition
Media a tool to build alliances
across diverse opposition
groups divided by race and
class
Journalists alignment with one
of rival factions within the
regime (hard liners or soft
liners)
Liberalization deepens divisions
within ruling regime between
hard and soft liners
Domestically available exiled and
foreign media sustain opposition
resolve by providing a sense of
solidarity
Copying and distributing
transborder media to those who
cannot receive it directly expands
opposition network
Addition:
* Opposition parties suspicious of unknown journalists, leading to poor communications strategies)
Non-state media divided over accommodation with the ruling regime
St
at
e
State suppression and
surveillance of independent
media
State grants new freedoms, but
for their own political purpose,
not as constitutional rights
State determines scope of
political debate—some topics
remain taboo despite relaxing
censorship
State jams international
broadcasts and imposes stiff
penalties for those consuming and
distributing forbidden media
Limited access for foreign
journalists
Addition:
State lacks capacity and knowhow to improve communications with the public via the media
M
ar
ke
ts
Pro-democracy opposition
have their own media
(including dissident and
underground media) that
challenge state media
narratives
State-controlled media persists,
despite marketization
delivering some pluralism
Independent media largely
dependent on intra-regime
factions for economic survival
Opposition (including media)
funded by foreign donors and
political exiles
Foreign media available in the
domestic market
Addition:
Tabloidization undermines quality of information and public confidence in the media
frequently undermine journalistic professionalism dur-
ing liberalization. The youth and inexperience of those
drawn into journalism as the media expands under lib-
eralization have negative consequences for professional
standards and ethics that can in turn impede the liberal-
ization process. These challenges are exacerbated by the
accessibility and anonymity afforded by social media. In
the presence of civil conflict, ethnic or religious loyalties
can further encourage journalists to abdicate their pro-
fessional responsibilities.
Political parallelism was a significant factor influenc-
ing the features and functions of the Myanmar media.
As expected by Voltmer when societal demands from
below are a cause of liberalization, much of the non-
state media in Myanmar was found to support the
pro-democracy opposition. Many Myanmar journalists
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viewed themselves as activists rather than as neutral
observers of events, as liberal models of journalism
would suggest. Although some journalists were close to
the opposition NLD, others outside the party’s tightknit
circle were treated with suspicion, despite sharing its
pro-democracy aims. In Myanmar’s highly partisan en-
vironment, journalists seeking to hold the opposition,
as well as the government, to account were ostracized
by both sides. The NLD’s suspicion of strangers sharing
their democratic sympathies suggests Voltmer’s claims of
close relations between the opposition and independent
media requires qualification (Table 4).
Myanmar’s liberalization was initiated from above as
well as from below. Like authoritarian leaders in China
and the Soviet Union, Myanmar’s military-backed gov-
ernment pursued liberalization to mitigate societal de-
mands for political change that might otherwise become
difficult to control (Mickiewicz, 1997; Steinhardt, 2010).
The media were granted new freedoms as a means for
the regime to achieve its broader policy objectives, most
notably to end Western sanctions. New freedoms were
not constitutionally guaranteed. Given the uneven play-
ing field, Myanmar’s journalists differed over how much
to accommodate the ruling regime. Some journalists sup-
ported unrestrained struggle, while other supported cau-
tious compromise. Thosewilling tomeet themilitary half
way did not align with regime soft liners as Voltmer’s the-
ories predict. Rather these journalists saw reconciliation
with the military as the only means to building lasting
peace and democracy. This more nuanced understand-
ing of journalists’ motives for sometimes working with
the regime is included inmy suggestions for refining Volt-
mer’s theories in Table 4.
Although liberalization expanded the range of issues
open for critical discussion in themedia, the state contin-
ued to determine the scope of debate. Despite the aboli-
tion of official censorship in 2012, the state retained sig-
nificant legal means to coerce the media, fostering a cul-
ture of self-censorship. Travel restrictions limited access
to trouble spots by domestic and international journal-
ists. A culture of suppression and secrecy enduredwithin
state institutions despite reforms. Interviewees for this
study, however, assert that the state’s lack of capacity for
effective communications in part accounts for its ongo-
ing culture of secrecy. The state’s inexperience and weak-
ness at public relations are not mentioned by Voltmer,
but are included in my recommendations for expanding
her theories in Table 4.
Despite introducing commercialization, the state re-
mained themain player inMyanmar’s mediamarket dur-
ing the country’s liberalization. Financing from interna-
tional donors and other independent revenue streams
were minor in comparison to the economic resources of
the state and its business allies. Opposition-operatedme-
dia were low in circulation and consumed mainly by the
converted. Although often serving the political and eco-
nomic interests of their owners, commercial-media out-
lets acted as a counterweight to pronouncement in the
state-owned media. But as combatants in the factional
wars within the ruling regime the commercial media
were limited in their watchdog role. The tabloidization
unleashed by marketization curtailed the media’s ability
to encourage societal reconciliation and to present po-
litical alternatives, important functions in an emerging
democracy. The negative repercussions of tabloidization
are not accounted for in Voltmer’s theories. Their addi-
tion to her framework is my last recommendation in Ta-
ble 4.
Voltmer’s theories provide a useful framework for un-
derstanding the media’s role as a subject and agent of
change in Myanmar’s liberalization. At the same time,
as a case study, Myanmar provides insights into how
these theories might be expanded and refined in the
future. The inauguration of a new government in 2016
notwithstanding, many obstacles remain to achieving a
genuinely free media in Myanmar. Some of these chal-
lenges, such as self-censorship, are hangovers from the
junta period, while others, such as tabloidization, are
products of liberalization. TheMyanmarmedia has never
functioned as a democratic fourth estate. But although
the range of views on offer is far from complete and the
operation of the market deeply flawed, the media today
provide Myanmar audiences with a form of imperfect
pluralism on which to build a more democratic future.
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